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America’s Future in LEO? The Possibilities and Challenges Facing Commercial Space Stations

For over 15 years, the International Space Station has been a hallmark of the United States’ space program. As the largest and longest continually-occupied orbital platform in history, it has become an iconic representation of this period in space history. A product of large-scale international cooperation buttressed by the United States’ diplomatic, technical, and scientific expertise, ISS has been a cornerstone in American space leadership. Among the most expensive and complicated projects NASA has ever undertaken, it provides the United States significant opportunities and capabilities as the country begins to develop space close to Earth and explore space farther from home. However, like all past programs, ISS is not a permanent commitment. At some point in the future it will meet its demise in a fiery deorbit over the Pacific Ocean. When it does, will it mark an end of an era for the United States in space? More importantly:

What, if anything, will constitute the United States’ continuing presence in low Earth orbit (LEO) once the International Space Station (ISS) is gone?

This question is of considerable significance for the country’s future space effort. Emblematic of uncertainty regarding the United States’ long-term objectives and strategy for space, it is an issue that, as of today, remains unresolved. Though garnering only marginal attention in the media and by policymakers bracing for a new presidential administration, NASA’s trajectory suggests the need for a nuanced high-level look at this question soon, if not now.

For, per the Office of Science and Technology Policy’s Ben Roberts, the fate and future of LEO is “one of the most pressing [space policy] issues” that the next president will have to make in “the next 2-3 years.” Sharing this view is Michael French, NASA’s Chief of Staff, who noted at the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee’s October 2016 meeting that “the questions of an ISS follow-on and ISS extension start entering the budget horizon” as soon as 2019 – a near to mid-term issue for the new administration.

The International Space Station. Credit: NASA

Though the International Space Station is currently scheduled to operate through 2024, its end is an inevitability. Aside from the extent of its needed utilization, the station’s hardware can only last so long – likely into but not much longer than the late 2020s or early 2030s, per NASA experts. Much of that hardware has been made to be replaceable, but replacing it to extend ISS’s lifetime would require a continuing funding commitment. In that timeframe, however, it is highly probable that NASA resources will instead go predominately in support of the deep-space human exploration that Congressional leaders and administration officials have laid out as the space program’s foremost mission.

Facing a limited budget, NASA will unlikely be able to afford a station program after ISS. NASA’s exploration roadmap does not permit a continuing presence in LEO sustained by the civil effort alone; preparing to move into cis-lunar space and perhaps beyond, the agency has signaled its general intent to leave low Earth orbit behind. As said by Bill Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations, the agency is “going to get out of ISS as quickly as we can… NASA’s vision is we’re trying to move out.”

If NASA is incapable of sustaining an American presence in LEO after 2024, then who will – and how?

Increasingly, government officials and the private sector are envisioning a commercial “takeover” of LEO. The hope is that commercial space stations, as a catalyst for and part of a vibrant economic sphere of activity in LEO, will allow government users to fulfill their needs while enabling business and research opportunities for commercial and foreign actors.

Still, despite growing consensus on this vision, significant questions and uncertainties regarding how it will be brought into reality, if at all, remain. Will the United States have outstanding needs in LEO after ISS is gone? What is NASA’s role in a transition toward commercial space stations? What ways could ISS be used to support that transition? As evidenced by recent statements from government officials and industry stakeholders, opinions vary considerably and, occasionally, contradictorily.

Answers are, at present, unclear. As the economization of commercial space stations remains to be realized, these answers necessarily underlie the direction NASA and industry will take toward a solution. Arriving at concrete positions through policies such as a “transition plan” should be an active priority for policymakers. Whatever the ultimate solution (or lack thereof) to this issue, it is bound to have significant implication for the future of the American effort in outer space.

Through a look at the statements and positions of industry stakeholders and government officials, this essay explores the topic as it stands today. Though hardly an authoritative analysis of the issue, it lays out the case for a continuing presence in LEO, outlines the vision for – and challenges facing – commercial space stations in the future, and describes the programmatic and policy progress made toward resolving this issue.


The Case for LEO


Far more than just a location to which NASA is currently committed, low Earth orbit is an enabling environment with a wide range of utility – geopolitical, scientific, and, increasingly, economic. The benefits of LEO, borne through a space station, underpin the United States’ application of space: it is an avenue for international cooperation and partnership, a laboratory for biological and technological research, and a proving ground and anchor for commercial development and activity.

Unless the United States develops and fosters follow-on station capability beyond ISS, it risks “losing” LEO. This risk has the potential to be as considerably destabilizing to the American space effort as a significant shakeup in NASA’s programmatic status quo; deorbiting ISS with nothing in its stead is tantamount to a broad concession of space capability and leadership.

Many therefore see a strong case for a sustained LEO presence, be it in the form of a civil or commercial station, after ISS is gone.

As an “entry point” into space, LEO is more accessible to commercial and foreign actors than locations such as cis-lunar space or Mars. It will likely remain, even into the post-ISS future, the most prominent location for international and commercial partnership. Sustaining an American station presence would leave open avenues to cooperate and collaborate with new spacefaring states; or, in a commercial LEO, provide them time on-station for purchase.

Mike Gold, while Director of Washington Operations for Bigelow Aerospace, a commercial space station company, observed that “new opportunities for international partnerships are opening in LEO” at an April 2016 National Academy of Sciences panel. Mirroring that view, Space Studies Board Chair Dr. David Spergel noted that “there are more ‘spacefaring’ nations now” than ever before and that new actors will want to utilize on-orbit platforms for their national purposes.

A concept of a Bigelow space station. Credit: Bigelow Aerospace

This is the hope of prospective commercial station operators, who see foreign governments as necessary clients in their business models. While discussing his company in 2007, Robert Bigelow, President of Bigelow Aerospace, stated that they would look to “sovereign clients;” the company hopes to “try and identify maybe 50 or 60 countries… to provide them [time on a station].” Mike Baine, Chief Engineer of Axiom Space, another commercial station company, noted at the 2016 ISPCS Conference that “there’s a lot of interest by other governments looking to get into the space arena.” Some of those governments, Baine predicted, will likely be anchor customers for Axiom’s station.

As with any international partnership or arraignment, leadership is assumed by those countries which “show up.” As should be expected, if the United States comes to lack station capabilities after ISS, international partners (or potential customers) with national goals in LEO will turn to countries, some adversarial, which are actively developing them.

Russia seeks a future space station through possibly detaching, and then adding onto, its ISS modules sometime in the next decade. China is steadily working toward a modular station in the early 2020s, for which it is courting significant international participation. Noting the challenge presented by the growth of foreign space capabilities concurrent to the end of the ISS program, Scott Pace, Director of George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute, warned at a February 2015 Senate hearing that,

“if China is able to offer pragmatic opportunities for space cooperation on its own space station… and the United States cannot, then other countries will likely find it attractive to forge closer relationships with China. Such a shift in international space influence away from the United States and toward China will, no doubt, impact a wide range of U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, both in space and in other arenas.”

Taking this argument further, Gold worries that “if America fails to field a new space station, U.S. leadership in this arena will quickly be subsumed by China.” Lest this happens, the United States should “should provide a clear vision to its international partners for what will come after the ISS,” including “if the path forward is a private sector station.”

As with the dynamics of international partnership, the commercial rationale for LEO makes a compelling case for a sustained American presence.

The predominance of commercial spaceflight, particularly that which supports human spaceflight, occurs in low Earth orbit. As the commercial space industry continues to broaden and grow, this will likely remain true – especially as new commercial applications are envisioned which make use of, or indeed require, on-orbit platforms. The addressable market for a commercial station could be as large as $37 billion dollars in the 2020s through 2030s, according to a study commissioned by Axiom Space.

Microgravity research, especially for biomedical products, has long been an area of interest for commercial application of low Earth orbit. Increasingly, concepts such as on-orbit additive manufacturing and on-orbit satellite assembly – which may require orbital platforms – are coming prominently to the fore of discussion. Still, it remains to be seen whether these concepts can be made profitable enough to allow commercial self-sustainability; or, as is especially the case for microgravity research, become more economical than terrestrial analogs. Nonetheless, the long-term success of these concepts and the markets that develop as a corollary will only come into fruition through sustained access to LEO platforms upon which companies may experiment and operate.

Beyond hosting commercial applications, an importance of LEO platforms is the support they provide to commercial launch services. While satellite launches may provide needed revenue for rocket companies, station resupply has come to be the “primary driver” in the shift from government to commercial LEO access. Gerstenmaier noted this at the 2013 FAA Commercial Space Transportation Conference, saying that “station is driving this market.”

He further suggested that “station has the potential to drive a fair amount of privately funded launches, separate from the U.S. government, and that could be the real benefit” of a space station. Industry stakeholders likewise see a need for more destinations as companies offering launch services grow in the years ahead. Addressing that point at the NewSpace 2015 Conference, Jeff Manber, Managing Director of NanoRacks, made note that there will soon be “five ways [via different launch providers] to send humans to and from space… we need destinations.” The functions of a platform, such as deploying nanosats as NanoRacks does, “makes destinations relevant. I don’t want to be in a world where we’re just launching rockets, sending off satellites.”

Indeed, supporting commercial launch and resupply has been a clear priority for Bigelow, who noted that his company “will be a substantial consumer of rockets and capsules and all kinds of hardware.” Commercial station companies, of course, will be wholly reliant upon launch services for their operations; in the absence of government-furnished resupply, commercial launch companies will be the sole providers of crew and cargo to their stations. To that end, Bigelow has, at various times, partnered with Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and SpaceX in support of developing and contracting commercial vehicles that could resupply its stations.

Finally, there is the issue of U.S. government need in LEO; though NASA is preparing to move beyond, the agency’s research for a deep-space exploration campaign remains incomplete. Alongside that, several government officials and industry experts expect a continuing need and role for NASA in LEO.

Most notably, NASA has identified a need to conduct LEO research in support of its beyond-Earth orbit (BEO) objectives on a timeline which extends past the current ISS program policy. The ISS’s end-of-life, per this policy, is currently scheduled for 2024. However, in a presentation to the NASA Advisory Council (NAC) – an independent advisory committee providing strategic guidance and recommendations to the agency – in July 2016, the NAC Human Exploration and Operations Committee showed an ISS research timeline for BEO risk reduction that extends into FY27. In effect, NASA anticipates requiring ISS beyond its currently scheduled timeline to complete the full slew of its research needs.

Alongside its currently identified research requirements, there may be forthcoming needs for which NASA will require a LEO platform. Jason Crusan, Director of NASA’s Advanced Exploration Systems Division, noted in a May 2016 hearing before the House Subcommittee on Space that “the agency expects to support continued research needs in LEO after the end of the ISS program.” Sam Scimemi, Director of ISS at NASA HQ, gave a presentation at the National Academy panel which predicted that “the government would purchase services or capabilities to meet its demand for research or other human space flight objectives.” At the December 2015 NAC meeting, former astronaut Ken Bowersox argued that NASA will continue to need LEO access “if for no other reason than to allow astronauts some experience before they sign on to longer duration missions.” Mary Lynn Dittmar, CEO of Dittmar Associates, suggested at the NewSpace 2015 Conference that “NASA will continue to need an environment in which it buys down those risks [of BEO human exploration] to a certain point.”

Moreover, Roberts argued that, without some other manned platform with which to conduct research, it will be very hard for the United States to “go beyond LEO.” At a February 2015 workshop on ISS utilization, Scimemi, said that “we, the government, want another viable space station before this one ends” to prevent a detrimental gap in low Earth orbit. He observed that “if the space station ends in the 2020s and there’s nothing to follow it, we will have lost all of this effort in research and benefits to humanity.”


Considering Commercial


Considering these rationales and recent developments in the private space sector, many in industry and the government are beginning to turn their eyes to commercial space stations as potential follow-on capability after ISS. While ISS is a unique platform with unique capabilities borne from unique circumstances, a commercial station may be able to duplicate its functions – or find other applications for LEO that benefit the space effort.

A concept of Axiom Space’s free-flying station. Credit: Axiom Space

Some, particularly advocates in industry, foresee this. In the eyes of Gwynne Shotwell, President of SpaceX, commercial space station companies have been “founded to help create a new era in space enterprise;” commercial stations would “provide unique opportunities to entities – whether nations or corporations – wishing to have crewed access to the space environment for extended periods.” Tory Bruno, Chief Executive and President of ULA, agrees. At a press conference at the 32nd Space Symposium announcing ULA’s partnership with Bigelow, he pointed out that “this is a fundamentally new mission in space… we haven’t had one of those in 20 or 30 years, arguably.” Developing a commercial space station infrastructure in LEO would be “creating new things to do in space, making the space economy larger.”

This potential is seen by NASA officials, too. At the FAA’s Commercial Space Transportation Conference in February 2015, Gerstenmaier acknowledged that “there needs to be a follow-on space station… what [NASA’s] hoping for is that the private sector picks that up.” Alex Hill, NASA Deputy Associate Administrator for Exploration Systems Development, reiterated this view. “Ultimately, our desire is to hand the space station over to either a commercial entity or some other commercial capability so that research can continue in low-earth orbit.”

In perhaps the most emphatic declaration of NASA’s hope for private stations emerging, Crusan said at the May 2016 hearing before the House Subcommittee on Space that,

“It is NASA’s intention to transition LEO to private platforms and capabilities enabled by commercial markets, academia and government agencies, including NASA, with interest in LEO research and activities… The progress and trajectory of private sector space activity is such that NASA is working toward the transition of LEO to be a commercially-led economic sphere by the mid-2020s.”

Describing a need for a commercialized LEO, he concluded that,

“Private enterprise and affordable commercial operations in LEO will enable a sustainable step in our expansion into space — a robust, vibrant, commercial enterprise with many providers and a wide range of private and public users will enable U.S. industry to support other government and commercial users safely, reliably, and affordably.”

While enthusiasm for commercial stations may be growing, there are varying opinions about their defining designs and characteristics – a reflection, perhaps, of varying opinions about the true extent of their economic viability. Bigelow’s expandable B330 habitats, once inflated, have a volume of 330 meters – enough to, if attached to ISS, expand the station’s volume by at least 30 percent. Some of Bigelow’s station concepts, such as its Station Alpha, feature multiple B330s attached to each other, thereby offering enough capability to house multiple, perhaps even a dozen, astronauts.

Bigelow’s concept for “Station Alpha.” Credit: Bigelow Aerospace

Yet Gerstenmaier suggested that commercial stations will instead likely “be very single-purpose, small and entrepreneurial” and possibly be built upon existing or planned spacecraft. John Elbon, Vice President and General Manager for Space Exploration at Boeing, thinks that future commercial stations will be comparatively simple, perhaps more similar to Skylab than the ISS. Roberts, too, believes that “more economical concepts than the ISS are emerging.” The first step toward a commercial station would be to experiment with more basics systems than the ISS; he foresees dedicated research facilities aboard commercial orbital vehicles that would be operated telerobotically.

Regardless of what characteristics may define a future commercial station, the challenges facing the station industry to even arrive at them are substantial.

Despite NASA’s hope that commercial space stations emerge by the end of ISS, the agency has stressed that it is neither positioned nor suited to directly support the economization effort needed for them to be viable. While NASA Administrator Charlie Bolden suggested at the September 2016 AIAA Space and Astronautics Forum and Exposition that NASA will “facilitate [a] transition” to a commercialized LEO, it is, per Gerstenmaier, “the commercial sector’s responsibility, not NASA’s,” to find the demand for future space stations. NASA, as he points out, “is not an economic development agency.” Station companies, when developing a business case, should not “assume what we need… listen to the demand.”

Developing economic sustainability is fundamental for the success of commercial stations. The funding pressures drawing NASA away from ISS equally restrict the agency from serving as the long-term primary client of the companies operating them. Recognizing this, NASA officials have reinforced the need for the private sector to find a successful continuing business case that would provide revenue independent of government contracts.

“It is our hope and our goal that the commercial market, which is emerging in low Earth orbit today, will become self-sustaining,” declared Bolden in his speech. Gerstenmaier, at the 2013 FAA Commercial Space Transportation Conference, drew an association between that goal and NASA’s disinterest in economically supporting commercial stations. “If we just stay with the government-funded research, I don’t think that’s sustainable in the long term… at some point we need to show that there’s a market advantage, there’s a reason that commercial companies want to be in space, independent of the government.”

At present, however, the key challenge for the private sector is finding that business case.

The search is for a “killer app” that will generate demand for a commercial station and provide sustainable profitability. Highlighting this, Gold predicted that “if we do find the killer applications, or even applications that can at least be profitable, we are looking at not just modules on the ISS, not just one private-sector free flyer, but multiple stations.”

What that killer app is, however, remains to be discovered. Until it is, the optimism driving the commercial station constituency will remain simply that.

“What can we not do without that we have to get from space?” inquired Frank Culbertson, President of Orbital ATK’s Space Systems Division research. “We don’t have that yet.” Similarly noting the issue, Paul Reichert of Merck, a pharmaceutical company that has done crystal growth experiments on ISS, has “always had visions of doing manufacturing in space.” However, “before you can do that, you need to show a unique benefit. I don’t have that data yet.”

Even microgravity research, long seen as and hoped to be a profitable purpose for a space station, faces uncertainties. “You won’t find bigger believers in the revolutionary capabilities that microgravity R&D can bring,” said Gold. “However, that market is very immature right now, and it is going to take a long time to grow. I don’t think we’re going to see it in the next 10 years.” Gerstenmaier, acknowledging the threat hanging over microgravity pharmaceutical research, pointed out that “we could create a 99% pure insulin on orbit, [but terrestrial research] could create a 98% pure insulin through genetic engineering. That won because they could turn to the market faster and be responsive”

As such, the demand for commercial platforms right now is “very uncertain,” according to Carissa Christensen, Managing Partner of the research firm Tauri Group. The technological complexities and investments involved in a platform are so large that “business cases are generally not yet proven.” Mike Suffredini, formerly NASA’s ISS Manager and now President of Axiom Space, acknowledges this. “We’ve made great strides, but we have a long way to go to be at the point where we can pay our own way… where we are is not enough for investors to separate themselves from the hundreds of millions of dollars it takes to get started.” Addressing the crux of the problem, he noted that the commercial space industry isn’t yet mature enough to warrant the development of a commercial station.


Questions of CASIS


Intersecting the issue of a viable business case for private stations is the role of the Center for the Advancement of Science in Space (CASIS), the non-profit whose purpose is to support space commercialization in the “National Lab” portion of ISS. With a $15 million share of NASA’s budget each year, CASIS’s mission is to attract private researchers to ISS through grants, outreach, and access to station time. In finding the “killer app” or viable commercial rationale for a private station, “the national lab, CASIS, is critical to the development of that demand,” according to Scimemi.

However, CASIS’s overall effectiveness in achieving that goal has come under considerable question. Such could perhaps be garnered intuitively from the persistent economic uncertainty regarding business cases for commercial stations. At any rate, a 2013 OIG audit and 2015 GAO report found significant communications and reporting lapses in CASIS’s operation, including a failure to benchmark measures of performance. The OIG audit concluded that “fostering a market for ISS research remains a significant challenge for CASIS.”

Beyond organizational failures, several factors play into the challenge facing CASIS – factors which are symptomatic of the overall struggle in determining profitable on-orbit commercial activities.

Among them is little interest on the part of private entities for research aboard ISS unless there is, per the OIG audit, a “substantial infusion of government funds.” Much of the research conducted under CASIS’s banner has been basic research, toward which for-profit companies may be reluctant to allocate funds – especially when the chance of profitable results is unknown. To that, Cynthia Bouthot, Director of Commercial Innovation and Sponsored Programs at CASIS, acknowledged that companies don’t “understand why they would think of diverting any of their research or technology development to station.” Moreover, the OIG audit noted additional limitations to commercial research on ISS, including the “frequency of tests and time dedicated to the experiment” and “the number of samples that can be conducted concurrently and repeatedly.”

CASIS’s issues may be resolved through more effective outreach to companies and because of changing circumstances in the space industry. Some see a basic lack of awareness on the part of terrestrial industries about the benefits of microgravity as the leading impediment to the search for commercial space applications. Ioana Cozmuta, Microgravity Lead at AMES Space Portal, sees that “the awareness is extremely low still out there.” Still, noting positive trends, she continued that “the gamechanger is commercial space and this burst of capabilities” for microgravity research. The success of commercial launch may lend support to expanded users of ISS’s commercial research component… “the price per pound is going in the right direction.”

Such may be the case. At the March 2016 National Academy panel, Scimemi defended CASIS, saying the organization “is making great strides in advancement on board the ISS to utilize their assets that are available to them through the national lab… they have come up to speed with a vengeance.”


NAC’s Worries


Despite Scimemi’s assurances, however, members of the NASA Advisory Council remain skeptical of the both CASIS’s effectiveness and the viability of future commercial space stations.

Following a presentation by CASIS leadership during the March 2016 NAC meeting, the Council issued worries about the perceived lack of progress the non-profit was making. Thomas Young noted that “if private enterprise thought that there was a real commercial opportunity in LEO, they would go for it,” further suggesting that “CASIS should get out of the way.” He opined that CASIS “doesn’t seem to have a high probability of success.” Former NAC Chair Dr. Steve Squyre said that “it would be unfortunate if the crew time or up-mass dedicated to CASIS slowed down progress in getting to Mars,” while Dr. Spergel concurrently cautioned “against relying on CASIS to develop a commercial market for LEO because it would interfere with getting to Mars.”

From the discussion, the Council issued a recommendation that NASA examine its research work to see if time used at the National Lab would better be spent on exploration research. The recommendation stated that the Council “feels that it would be beneficial for the agency to better understand the effect that the resources being devoted to the ISS National Laboratory might have on the important research needed to reduce technology and human health risk for the Journey to Mars.” In effect, driven by dual concerns that ISS will end before research for NASA’s Mars campaign is complete and that CASIS is not effectively conducting its mission, the Council suggested that NASA should reprioritize exploration research over commercial research – an indictment of the present-day utilization of ISS toward LEO commercialization.

At the December 2015 NAC meeting, the Council issued equally indicting hesitancies regarding the prospects for commercial space stations.

Wayne Hale stated that “it remains to be seen whether there could be a reasonable return on investment” for building a commercial station; Young concurred, saying that NASA should encourage commercial opportunity in LEO “but not spend much time on it.” Instead, NASA should “move on to the deep space exploration program as soon as possible,” adding that he did not think “that the commercial opportunities were strong.” Likewise, Scott Hubbard opined that the “Journey to Mars and cis-lunar space is not dependent upon commercial development in LEO” and that “the LEO business models that are likely to succeed would not require humans in LEO.”

Following the discussion, the Council issued a recommendation stating that,

“Even after a shift of focus to cis-lunar space and beyond has occurred, NASA may need to maintain some capability to get astronauts to low Earth orbit. If the Agency concludes that such a capability is necessary, it would be best not to rely on a presumed commercial demand for human access to LEO that may or may not materialize. Taking steps to encourage commercial activity in LEO may not be adequate to guarantee NASA long-term future access to LEO.”


ISS’s Indefinite End Date


Perhaps in recognition of NASA’s continuing research needs and NAC’s concerns, NASA officials have begun to downplay a definitively set date for when it will stop using the facility.

Speaking at the National Academy panel, Scimemi suggested that NASA no longer sees 2024 as its firm end date for ISS. Rather, the date will be determined and perhaps extended based on “task completion.” This aligns with Gerstenmaier’s presentation at the March 2016 NASA Advisory Council. It noted that, when determining when NASA will stop using the station, the agency will focus on considerations such as:

“Short term crewed habitation missions are being executed in cis-lunar space while ISS is still operational and being utilized; exploration research and technology/system development activities requiring ISS as a testbed are essentially complete; value benefit of the ISS has been sufficiently achieved; there is an expanded commercial market and broad private/government/academic demand for Low Earth Orbit (LEO)-based platforms that are based on private and/or public/private business models.”

Of course, the decision of when ISS’s funding commitment runs out – a driving determiner of its lifetime – is a legislative matter. The Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, passed in late 2015, extended ISS’s lifetime to “at least 2024” from the previous end date of 2020. Some leaders in Congress, however, want to see it extended longer. Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL), Ranking Member of the Senate committee responsible for NASA, has made clear that ISS’s lifetime should extend to the “end of the decade.” During an August 2016 visit to Johnson Space Center, Ted Cruz (R-TX), Chairman of the Senate’s space subcommittee, said that ISS should continue flying through 2028.

Likewise, there are indications that the next administration may seek to extend the United States’ commitment to ISS. Though the incoming Trump administration’s space policy, mainly laid out in op-eds and comments by campaign space policy advisor Bob Walker, is heavy in rhetoric yet still sparse in detail, the topic has come up a number of times. Speaking about ISS at the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee’s meeting before the election, Walker said that he “can’t imagine that, in 2028, you’re going to dump a $100 billion asset into the ocean.” Among the list of space policy priorities he laid out for the Trump campaign was “starting discussions about including more ‘private and public partners’ in operations and financing of the International Space Station, including extending the station’s lifetime.”

To that end, the “National Aeronautics and Space Administration Transition Authorization Act of 2016,” a bill currently in Congress, addresses ISS’s end date. At the time of this writing, the legislation, largely designed to lock-in place NASA’s programs of record to protect them during the transition to a new administration, faces a tight deadline for passage. Moreover, the bill’s provisions have changed substantially as it has gone through conference between the House and the Senate. Nonetheless, in the publicly available version of the bill dated to late November, Section 303 calls on NASA to evaluate the “feasible and preferred service life of the ISS… through at least 2028, as a unique scientific, commercial, and exploration-related facility.”

Extending ISS’s lifetime to 2028 or beyond carries possible benefits and potential drawbacks. It would provide NASA the opportunity to complete its currently anticipated portfolio of necessary research as identified in the July 2016 NAC meeting. Likewise, depending on the path forward for commercial utilization of ISS, it would provide industry more time to develop a business case for their private stations. Should that case develop, however, ISS’s continuation could be a burden for industry. In Suffredini’s opinion, so long as ISS is in operation it will attract users that could otherwise buy time on a commercial station – complicating their business case.

At any rate, the legislation’s passage remains in question; even if it does pass, there is no guarantee that ISS will indeed be extended. Some experts have spoken of NASA’s incapacity to sustain ISS through 2028 while carrying on a concurrent BEO exploration campaign, especially if funding levels remain flat. At a February 2016 hearing before the House Space Subcommittee, Young said, reiterating NAC concerns, that NASA does not have enough money to “both send humans to Mars and support the International Space Station beyond 2024 and a choice must be made between them.”

Meanwhile, as Scimemi noted at the International Aeronautical Conference in late September 2016, there is an international dynamic to ISS extension. He felt that it “too early to think about extending ISS to 2028” as NASA needed “to get ESA to agree to extension to 2024 first.” The European Space Agency recently did, though as part of its increasingly constrained budget; there is no certainty that the Europeans, or other partners in the ISS cooperative agreement, will agree to yet another extension. For, as Pace noted in his testimony, “political commitments may fade” amidst developments and fiscal pressures in the years to come.


ISS as Incubator


Against this backdrop – time running down on ISS and uncertainty about a lifetime extension, a continuing rationale for a LEO presence, consensus on a commercial LEO future, and questions about CASIS’s effectiveness – the pressure to find a sustainable business case that generates demand for private stations is increasing. Right now, in the eyes of Andrew Rush, President and CEO of Made in Space, a company doing additive manufacturing work aboard ISS, “is an inflection point for continued development of commercial activity in space.”

However, new ideas for utilizing ISS in support of commercialization are concurrently beginning to materialize. Beyond using the National Lab for research, some see value in ISS being a platform to test and experiment with commercial station hardware. Bigelow, at the ISS Research and Development Conference in July 2016, suggested this while saying, “starting with the purpose going forward for the ISS, I couldn’t think of a better metaphor than as an incubator.”

Bigelow’s BEAM module expanding aboard ISS. Credit: NASA

Precedent for attaching commercial module to ISS already exists; in April 2016, Bigelow’s “Expandable Activity Module” (BEAM) was flown and attached to the station. NASA awarded a $17 million contract to Bigelow in 2012 to construct the module, which is designed to be a testbed for larger expandable modules that may support NASA’s future habitation needs for long-duration spaceflight. Per Crusan, “we’re fortunate to have the space station to demonstrate potential habitation capabilities like BEAM.” After testing is complete, the module will be detached from ISS and deorbited in 2018.

Though BEAM’s primary purpose is as a technology demonstrator, Bigelow suggested that it could also be used for commercial applications. At a pre-launch conference, he said that his company has “four different groups today that want to fly experiments and different payloads to BEAM, and deploy those within BEAM.” Though he didn’t specifically name them, he said that two represent countries and the other two corporations. Bigelow hoped that “maybe in half a year or something, we can get permission from NASA to accommodate these people in some way.” However, little has come of the suggestion since the pre-launch conference; whether BEAM will be put to commercial use remains to be seen.

Moving beyond technology demonstrators, Axiom Space has begun making plans to attach and utilize commercial station module aboard ISS, while Bigelow has been talking about the concept for some time.

A rendering of Axiom Space’s module attached to ISS. Credit: Axiom Space

Laying out his intentions in an interview following the NewSpace 2016 Conference, Suffredini said that Axiom hopes to “fly a module that begins its life at the International Space Station” which would then later detach from ISS to form the core of a free-flying station. At the 2016 ISPCS Conference, the company outlined plans for the module: it would add two docking ports to the space station and be “as large as the U.S. laboratory module and Node 2 combined.” Meanwhile, at the April 2016 Space Symposium Conference, Bigelow said that his company would like to attach its B330 inflatable module – notionally named the Expandable Bigelow Advanced Station Enhancement, or XBASE – to ISS.

Both companies hope that their modules, while attached to ISS, could explore the commercial utility of a private station.

In an interview given while still serving as NASA’s ISS Manager, Suffredini identified a need for new applications of ISS that would advance the commercialization effort. He noted that NASA needed to find ways for “more and more customers [to] utilize ISS.” Doing so, “someday somebody can create a business case based on real data that says if I build a low Earth orbit platform, I can make money, and at that point we’ll have somebody build a platform that will replace ISS.”

Along those lines, Bigelow has suggested several functions, both in support of commercialization and to advance NASA’s mission, which his module could serve. If his company’s module is installed, “we’re also asking permission to be able to commercialize time and volume.” More specifically, the company’s hope is that,

“NASA would be the primary customer for that structure, and that we would be given permission to commercialize. Essentially, we would be timesharing. So, where we’re going is we’re offering discrete quantities of time—a matter of one or two weeks, to 45 days—to various kinds of clientele.”

Bigelow suggested that his module could attract additional commercial cargo and crew traffic to ISS, potentially helping NASA along with commercial users of ISS. He predicted that NASA, not having to add additional astronauts or resources, could make use of added space at a fraction of the cost it would take to develop its own module. Through the module, he said, “NASA maximizes the utility of its staff that is already on station. It may also be a facility that partners are going to get excited about. We think this will add life beyond 2024 to the ISS.”

Bigelow’s proposed XBASE attached to ISS. Credit: Bigelow Aerospace

Suffredini, too, thinks that a commercial module “will help us transition from research and manufacturing and everything else done on ISS on a future platform.” He noted that the Axiom module has attracted commercial interest for its possible use for in-space manufacturing and assembly and could have other uses ranging from research to tourism. Like Bigelow, he also proposed that the module would be available for NASA’s use when not being utilized by his company, thereby “helping the process of transitioning research done on the ISS to future stations.”

Still, regardless of these companies’ plans or their realizability, the clock is ticking. To make money with his station, Suffredini believes that Axiom needs to get to ISS by 2020 or 2021… “we have to get to orbit fast.” His concern is that “if ISS goes away, and commercial hasn’t established itself, we won’t have this opportunity” to establish a business case for private space stations.


NASA’s Initiatives


The hopes and intentions of commercial station companies aren’t lost on NASA officials, who have begun taking steps to establish programs that support them as they seek to build and use their stations.

Of these recent initiatives, the most important may be the opportunity NASA is preparing to offer industry to fly a module on ISS. At a Senate hearing on July 2016, Gerstenmaier said that NASA plans to provide one ISS docking port for a commercial module “at some point in the future.” Building off that port, the company could “undock from the station and be the basis for the next private sector station” – a reiteration of Axiom Space’s plan. Meanwhile, NASA posted a Request for Information, “Advancing Economic Development in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) via Commercial Use of Limited Availability, Unique International Space Station Capabilities,” which seeks to inform the agency what that plan will look like as well as gauge industry interest.

Companies responding to the RFI were offered several of ISS’s present-day “unique capabilities” when shaping their proposal. Among them were unused Common Berthing Mechanism ports – if the potential commercial user could demonstrate the capability to maintain ISS functionality – and ISS’s trunnion pins. The Common Berthing Mechanism attachment site at Node 3 Aft was suggested as a possible future capability. The RFI noted that the agency’s budget did not include any dedicated funds to enable the use of those capabilities, though ISS’s allocated budget could be available to cover “integration work if warranted.”

Among the information the RFI requested interested companies to provide, it sought plans on how their module activity would “intersect with the CASIS role to foster use of the National Laboratory.” Reflecting NASA’s hope that industry will not need to lean heavily on the agency for future funding as a client or sustaining partner, companies were asked to suggest ways that “NASA can incentivize a partner to stimulate economic development in LEO with minimal to no unique NASA direct investment.” Moreover, the RFI asked for suggestions of metrics that NASA could use to gauge and evaluate the success of the module and its commercialization efforts, such as:

“approaches for NASA to evaluate the plans for achieving and maintaining an appropriate balance between the responders’ commercial objectives and the Agency’s broader objectives of advancing economic development and private sector demand for research in space” as well as “minimum criteria to be met in order to retain on-going use of the capability.”

According to Gerstenmaier at the ISPCS Conference in October, 11 companies submitted responses to the RFI. At the International Astronautical Congress, Scimemi said the agency was “quite happy with the response…  we were happy with the number and the quality.” With that, NASA has decided to move ahead with “the process of providing companies with a potential opportunity to add their own modules and other capabilities to the International Space Station.”

As Gerstenmaier also noted at ISPCS, NASA is still evaluating the responses to the RFI. The agency is currently “struggling” with figuring out how to make the best use of the single available docking port available, considering the interest expressed by several companies. Nonetheless, NASA expects to release a more concrete plan by the end of the year.

While the specifics of NASA’s plan remain to be seen, this RFI signifies a major step toward employing ISS’s capability as a testbed for commercial station modules; equally so, it represents the agency’s acknowledgment of the commercial sector’s interest in flying those modules. Noting that significance, Gerstenmaier said at the July NASA Advisory Council meeting that “this is probably one of the most important RFIs we’ve put out in a long time… this will really set the future of what we’re going to try and do as we think of operations beyond the space station.”

Meanwhile, another NASA program – NextSTEP – is helping foster the development of commercial station hardware.

Run through NASA’s Advanced Exploration Systems Division, the NextSTEP program seeks “commercial development of deep space exploration capabilities to support more extensive human space flight missions in the Proving Ground around and beyond cislunar space.” At the May 2016 hearing before the House Subcommittee on Space, Crusan described the program’s aims:

“NASA and industry will identify [through NextSTEP] commercial capability development for LEO that intersects with the Agency’s long duration, deep space habitation requirements, along with any potential options to leverage commercial LEO advancements towards meeting NASA long duration, deep space habitation needs while promoting commercial activity in LEO.”

Built around the public-private partnership model, the program intends for developed capabilities to have spinoff applicability in LEO. The rationale, as argued by Crusan, is that,

“Because habitation capabilities are key to both commercial activity in LEO and to human deep space exploration, and because public-private partnerships can potentially help make habitation capabilities more affordable, NASA has been undertaking substantial private-sector engagement to define habitation concepts, systems, and implementation approaches to achieve NASA’s goals for deep space and enable progress towards LEO commercial space station capabilities.”

The preliminary NextSTEP announcement, issued in October 2014 with awards issued in March 2015, involved four companies – Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Orbital ATK, and Bigelow Aerospace – working on concept studies, concepts of operations, and technology investigation for an “Exploration Augmentation Module” – a habitat module to support NASA’s Orion spacecraft on missions beyond Earth orbit. Through Phase 1, NASA entered fixed-price contracts with these partners valued at $400,000 to $1 million.

In April 2016, NASA issued a solicitation for the subsequent phase of the program, NextSTEP-2. Through this phase, selected companies are given approximately 24 months to develop ground prototypes and/or conduct concept studies for their deep space habitats. It provides an opportunity for companies that did not participate in Phase 1 studies to “propose their innovative approaches that will both satisfy NASA’s initial NextSTEP Phase 1 objectives and the objectives contained” in NextSTEP-2. An objective of NextStep-2, per the solicitation, is to further determine how the agency’s habitation needs intersect “with private industry interest in commercial activities, for example in LEO.”

NASA awarded contracts to six companies – Bigelow Aerospace, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Orbital ATK, Sierra Nevada Corporation, and NanoRacks – in August 2016. The combined total of all the awards, covering work in 2016 and 2017, will be approximately $65 million, with additional efforts and funding continuing into 2018.

NextSTEP will allow NASA to gain, through commercial support, a key piece of exploration hardware without needing to bear the costs alone. Industry, meanwhile, will be able to leverage the hardware developed for potential commercial use in LEO as station modules. Of course, this alone will not be enough to catalyze a sustainable case for commercial stations. Some, such as Gold, who made note of this at a July 2016 Senate hearing, see room to “bolster the NextSTEP program”  by having NASA commit to “launching the habitat and paying the private sector partner for the right to utilize some its volume and resources” while industry funds “the vast majority of the habitat’s ongoing operation expenses via commercial activities.”


An ISS Transition Plan?


These programs are surely avenues of opportunity for private station companies and indicative of NASA’s hope for a commercialized LEO. However, they hardly constitute a comprehensive, long-term strategy for how the agency will use ISS to support the “transition” to commercial stations that its leadership has talked about. The lack of such a plan, according to experts both inside and outside the agency, poses considerable challenges toward commercialization.

Pace argued at the 2015 Senate hearing that “we need to have very thoughtful discussions and decisions very soon about not just ISS extension but, post-ISS, what that looks like… in aerospace terms, [2024] is right around the corner.” By saying that “if you’re not planning today what you’re going to do next, you’re planning to go out of business,” he highlighted the need for a long-term NASA strategy around which industry can align its efforts and which supports a predictable environment for investment. At the National Academy panel, Christensen expressed concern that NASA might divest from ISS before a commercial replacement is available. As such, she noted that it was reasonable to “ask the government what LEO facilities will exist in 2024, but not to ask that of a new industry.”

In a 2014 presentation at a NASA LEO commercialization workshop, Scimemi recognized that “industry is looking to NASA to define its demand in the future and to lay out an ISS end-of-life strategy, BEFORE they invest significant contributions for flight.” Such a strategy, he acknowledged, “informs industry where we are going and aids in raising of capital if investors can see how commercial desires fit within NASA’s plans.”

The presentation summarizing the results of that workshop found consensus among participants on these points. Among the take-aways of the workshop were that “NASA needs to develop its strategic plan, forecast its own needs for LEO beyond ISS, and be intentional about transitioning from supplier to customer.” Workshop participants also thought that NASA should be proactive in “outsourcing services related to operations and enabling more commercial services with government as customer.” At a Secure World Foundation event on commercial space stations in September 2015, Gold and Charles Miller, President of NexGen Space, raised similar points. “NASA needs to play some role as a catalyst,” Gold said, by agreeing to purchase capacity on commercial stations or supporting their development through a partnership like the one NASA used for commercial cargo and crew systems. Per Miller, “we need a seamless, low-risk transition to private, commercial space stations.”

Most notably, the summary presentation concluded with actionable steps for the near-term; leading among them was for NASA to “complete [the] strategic planning process and roadmap.”

Yet at the 2015 FAA Commercial Space Conference, Gerstenmaier conceded that “there’s a lack of a low Earth orbit strategic transition plan. We haven’t laid out how we’re going to do this transition… we definitely need to work on that.” While Scimemi noted at the National Academy panel that NASA has an “internal plan” for transitioning ISS to the commercial sector, he also acknowledged at the November 2016 SpaceCom Expo that the agency has “no good idea yet how to do it.”


The Issue at Hand and Questions Remaining


Such is the situation presently facing commercial station companies. While enthusiasm for commercial stations is growing and opportunities – such as NASA’s RFI and NextSTEP program – are opening the trade space, tremendous uncertainty about the viability of their future hangs over them. The pressure to find a viable business case is intense; assuming commercial modules are attached to ISS in 2 years, a rather liberal estimate, that leaves only 6 years for the station business to mature to a point of self-sufficiency. The experience of on-orbit commercial research has so far suggested against the likelihood of rapid breakthroughs. Still, the clock is ticking. As Pace noted, 2024 in aerospace terms is not very far away.

Compounding this issue is a lack of clarity on NASA’s part. Scimemi noted that industry is looking for NASA to define its post-ISS research needs and lay out a clear ISS end-of-life strategy before they begin providing crucial investment for commercial station companies. Yet, to date, NASA has suggested little about its continuing research needs aside from its general intent to “purchase services aboard private stations.” While NASA has begun to define a flexible end date for ISS that includes successful commercialization as a decision-point, it hasn’t clearly quantified or qualified what exactly that metric looks like regarding commercial stations. Meanwhile, conversation continues in Congress about an ISS extension.

NASA officials have themselves conceded the point, but to an outside observer such as this author it appears there isn’t a comprehensive plan for transitioning from ISS to commercial stations or certainty in the role that NASA will play both during that transition and beyond. Clearly, however, NASA is not only uniquely positioned in technical capability to support that eventual transition, but may be positioned to help catalyze investment into commercial stations and applications aboard them. NASA has continuing research needs; a commercial module may, as Bigelow and Axiom Space have repeatedly suggested, support and satisfy them. If NASA seeks an ISS extension, a commercial module may be a means to add to the station’s hardware’s lifetime. Of course, NASA is highly constrained in funds – which may, understandably, restrict any partnership NASA develops with commercial station companies. At the least, the agency should clearly articulate what it will and will not use commercial modules for during the extent of its remaining lifetime and what work commercial modules may conduct while attached.

Beyond that, however, NASA and Congress would do well to engage now in long-term planning for an ISS transition, addressing the outstanding questions and issues that industry stakeholders have identified and laying out a defined strategy for ISS that encompasses civil and commercial roles, responsibilities, and avenues for partnership until 2024. Such a plan could address the challenges facing on-orbit research and incorporate ideas that seek to resolve them, such as the concept of a “zero-g, zero-tax” write-off. What exactly that transition plan would look like or entail is beyond the knowledge and expertise of this author, yet would nonetheless be necessary progress from the present-day status-quo of ad-hoc programs and verbal guarantees given at conferences.

There are, of course, considerable factors influencing the ultimate decisions and direction that NASA takes that can be readily identified. As this issue moves forward, they will surely be topics of discussion among policymakers, NASA officials, and industry stakeholders. Some of these questions lack easy answers – pointing even more to the need for long-term planning in the present. Though not at all an exhaustive list, among them are:

  • The international dynamic. If commercial station companies are to utilize the ISS in a manner more extensive than what the current RFI entails, NASA will need to secure partner buy-in. Would the ISS partners be amenable to commercial companies utilizing and perhaps even supplementing ISS hardware?
  • Hardware and structural concerns. To what extent will ISS be able to accommodate additional commercial modules? How would NASA guarantee that commercial modules won’t cause structural issues aboard or damage to ISS? How would liability be handled should something “go wrong” aboard a commercial module or if a module negatively influences the rest of ISS?
  • NASA’s continuing research needs. Does NASA indeed have continuing needs for research after ISS is gone and, if so, what exactly are they? Would NASA be willing to pass onto commercial modules the hardware and facilities needed to continually conduct civil research while they’re aboard ISS? How about aboard free-flying stations? If so, how would that arraignment be structured contractually and operationally?
  • The challenges of LEO commercial research. How will NASA leverage commercial station modules to enhance CASIS’s effectiveness? Will the modules’ companies be allowed to commercial operate independent of CASIS? Would NASA allow flights of independent non-agency scientists, researchers, and crew to these modules to conduct experiments? Would NASA place restrictions on the hardware and experiments independently flown to these modules? If commercial modules attached to ISS require more frequently resupply flights, would they be contracted through NASA or independently – if the latter, how would that interface with NASA’s governance of ISS?

It may well be that a research breakthrough producing a “killer app” occurs on a commercial ISS module’s first day of operation. Bigelow and Axiom Space may find their entire business case resting on foreign governments willing to purchase their station service. Or, it may be that there is no business case at all and that foreign governments are uninterested in a commercial station. At this moment in time, each possibility is equally likely. However, for an issue as significant as the United States’ continuing presence in LEO, the result – be it success or failure – should be driven by thought-out strategy instead of relying upon organic developments.


The Author’s Perspective


For this author, the success of commercial space stations serves as a litmus test for the current wave of commercialization occurring in space. Stations are merely facilities, like an office building is merely a building – it’s what is done within them that matters. If no business case is found that will validate the need for and sustain operations of commercial space stations, it will be hard to conclude that space is a place where, as said by Manber and Blue Origin’s Jeff Bezos, “people can live and work.” As such, it is understandable that commercial station companies are pushing for NASA to provide them support and assistance to a degree that may extend beyond NASA’s resources. The continuing commercialization of LEO and beyond is ultimately at stake.

Moreover, the situation facing commercial stations reflects a changing paradigm in the space arena – and the continuing hesitancies to accept it. Commercial actors are beginning to envision doing the operations that once were the sole domain of government space programs. That the United States in LEO may come to be defined by corporate actors instead of NASA can be a source of alarm for some. That those actors will need to rely on successful business cases and withstand market competition instead of wholly sustaining themselves on the steady, if limited, flow of taxpayer dollars can be a source of skepticism for others. It may well be that these companies’ plans don’t pan out – in which case, little is lost from the status quo of a civil space program that has historically operated in fits and starts. It may too be that NASA supports commercial station companies which then go under, thereby “wasting” taxpayer dollars – in which case, little is changed from the status quo of a civil space program with a history of program cancellations, overbudget projects, and plans to abandon ISS anyway.

Yet, should these commercial station companies succeed, they will enable continuing government research in LEO and provide companies and corporations room to experiment with ever-new applications and technologies for space. They will serve as the crucial LEO infrastructure within which the democratization of space takes place. As evidenced by the point of the NextSTEP program, their habitat technology, likely continually iterating to beat out competition, could be put to more and more effective use by NASA as the civil program goes off to explore deep space. A growing market and more entrants into the station industry would permit different approaches in technology, design, and operations – innovation sorely needed for a field as difficult as spaceflight that’s inherently lacking in a government-run, fiscally constrained space program. Finally, commercial station companies, run by American citizens working in the United States, would ensure the continued presence of American values and American commerce that would otherwise be lost as American LEO leadership is subsumed by adversaries, such as China, that don’t share them.

Considering that, if pushing back the “Journey to Mars” – a program already question as a new administration takes office – is what’s needed to catalyze and support the success of American commercial space stations in Low Earth Orbit, this author believes it’s an acceptable concession to make.

Exploring the Divide Between Science and Security

A considerable divide, often seen manifest through science and technology policies and regulations, exists between the scientific community and the national security community. As an inherently forward-thinking group, the scientific community favors change, progress, and innovation; conversely, the national security community, concerned about matters of defense and its capacity to counter foreseen threats and challenges, favors the preservation and protection of a status quo for which it is accustomed and prepared. Change, especially unexpected change, is therefore considered threatening. The scientific community values, and indeed strives upon, collaboration, the open exchange of ideas, and the flow of knowledge. The national security community, on the other hand, values secrecy and control of information, lest it fall into the “wrong hands.” In this context, the dual-use nature of technology and knowledge puts pressure on the government to strike a balance between supporting its scientific constituents in their research and enabling the national security community to protect the nation by limiting and regulating the technologies and knowledge that research produces. For – as is decidedly the case with our control of the atom, knowledge of the cell, and power of the internet – the products of science have as much capacity to be used for evil, to harm our community, as they can be used for good to enhance our lives. Through a look at the issues of that balance, drawing from examples in the space field as a case-study, this essay examines this divide in the context of science and technology policy.

In the wake of the September 11th attacks, a renewed focus has been placed on protecting the American homeland and guaranteeing the safety of American citizens. Concerns that terrorist groups will utilize products of technological advancement – miniaturized nuclear weapons, biological and chemical agents, and cyberwarfare, to name a few – for harm have manifested themselves in policies and regulations restricting the scope and nature of what the scientific community can study and produce. For example, scientists studying biological agents have found that certain vectors and agents, deemed dangerous and weaponizable by the government despite their research value, have come under tight control and limitation. Meanwhile, continuing anxieties about the capabilities of conventional adversaries such as China, Russia, and Iran have been cause for government-issued controls on the export of particular technologies, limits on the communication and transfer of certain information and knowledge, and restrictions on who can participate in American scientific research and technological development.

Fears about the application of science and technology for malicious purposes are hardly new, however. Since the dawn of the atomic age and the Cold War, which was defined in large part by technological competition between the Soviet Union and the United States, scientists have found themselves under considerable scrutiny by the government and national security sector. Because of its potential application for dangerous purposes, scientific knowledge and know-how can be considered a security risk; this was particularly the case at the height of the ‘McCarthy era’ in the United States. A high-profile example of this, relevant to the space and rocketry field, is that of Tsien Hsue-Shen. A Chinese-born scientist, Tsien was instrumental in laying the foundation of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory; his research in fluid dynamics, structures, and engineering is regarded as making possible the United States’ entry into space. Amidst McCarthy-era fears and paranoia, however, he was accused of being a Communist sympathizer and deported to China. In the context of the Cold War security environment, the perceived threat he and his knowledge posed trounced his contributions to American science; ironically, upon his return to China, the Communist Party made full use of his skills – placing him in charge of the Chinese missile program. Tsein’s case is not unique; several scientists living and working in the United States have found themselves come under suspicion because of their work and suspicions of their loyalty. That some have been arrested and deported – both rightly and wrongly – reflects the delicate, occasionally damaging, balance that is struck between security concerns regarding scientists and their pursuit of knowledge.

Related to the concerns levied upon American scientists, the United States government places considerable restrictions upon foreigners who wish to pursue scientific and technological work in the United States. Borne from fears that these individuals may be agents working for other governments and/or that they will take their knowledge and skills back to their home nation upon their works completion, the government frequently prohibits foreigners from engaging in work that has dual-use risk or national security application. In the space field, for example, foreigners are often prohibited from working on technologies related to rockets, as that technology can equally be applied to the production of ballistic missiles. Accordingly, commercial rocket companies operating in the United States require that their engineers and technologists be United States citizens. Foreigners working for NASA or for commercial space companies often find themselves prohibited from entering restricted areas or accessing sensitive information and technology, despite its importance and relevance to their work. Again, this is reflective of the divide between the scientific and security communities; there are understandable security concerns regarding foreigners, especially those with places of origin that may be adversarial to the United States. However, it is equally understandable – and indeed beneficial – that foreigners would wish to pursue scientific and technological work in the United States. Attracting foreign talent and knowledge has historically been a major driver behind the United States’ scientific leadership and resulting technological and economic dominance. This form of open cooperation is native to the scientific mindset. Too restrictive of limitations and regulations on foreign scientists could therefore come at a detriment to scientific progress and economic growth, which may be equally challenging to the country as the possible security risks these scientists represent. Finding how, and where, to strike an appropriate balance for this issue is a continuing debate.

Associated with security concerns about foreign scientists making nefarious use of American scientific work and technology is the field of export control policies. These regulations require that certain items with defense-related uses, or commercial items which could have military applicability, be licensed before they’re exported to certain foreign countries. The security rationale, of course, is to prevent foreign countries or actors from acquiring advanced American-made technology which could then be used for harm; likewise, it is to prevent the reverse-engineering of that technology which would bring possible adversaries to a “level playing-field” with the United States. However, beyond covering simply tangible items and products, export controls also control the information and knowledge related to the export-controlled good. As such, transmitting that information or knowledge to a foreign national is considered an export and must therefore be licensed as well.  Because of this, American scientists often face difficulties in collaborating with scientists in foreign countries on topics that are covered by the United States’ export control list. This, of course, reflects the difference in perceptions between the security and scientific communities on the value of information – scientists seek the open flow of information, regardless of with whom, to collaborate and further advance the pursuit of their research; the government sees the open flow of information as a possible source of harm undermining the United States’ technological advantage against enemies.

The issue of export controls is particularly significant and pronounced in the space field. Satellite technology, which obviously has the capability to be used for military purposes, has for decades been under tight control by stringent export regulations. As such, space-related research involving satellites requires scientists to go through the lengthy and difficult licensing process to pursue their research – just to find, as is frequently the case, that they are denied. The effect this has on space science and collaboration has been considerably detrimental. Without the capacity to collaborate with foreigners abroad, American scientists find themselves disadvantaged through limited data sets; this is especially true for space, where foreign satellite capabilities may augment or supplement those of the United States or where the United States is simply lacking in capability. Beyond export controls impacting collaboration between non-government scientists studying space, government regulations have also had serious impact on the capacity for NASA to interact and partner with certain countries in pursuit of space science goals.

Since 2004, when it was mandated in law, NASA has been totally prohibited from partnering, collaborating, or even interacting with the Chinese space program. The rationale behind this prohibition was the same behind export controls in general – a fear that China, as a growing geopolitical competitor and adversary, will take the scientific and technological knowledge gained through partnership and apply it in ways that could disadvantage the United States. This is, seen through a security perspective, an entirely reasonable concern; the Chinese are known for actively reverse-engineering foreign technology and applying it to their military systems. However, because of the prohibition, NASA has been unable to even engage in scientific partnership with the Chinese space program. As China’s program is considerably funded and capable, particularly in the field of telescopes and space observation, this has doubtlessly come at a loss of scientific gain for both nations. Moreover, it has opened the trade space for Chinese space scientists to partner instead with the space programs and scientists of other countries – at the detriment to the United States’ scientific leadership and clout.

As evidenced by these policies and regulations, a divide clearly exists between the scientific community’s pursuit of knowledge and technology and the security community’s concerns that that knowledge and those technologies may be used for harm against the United States. The government, as both a resource for scientists and a protector of the American homeland, has tried to find a balance between this divide through policies that, with the lightest touch possible, limit the degree to which knowledge and technology can be acquired by possible foreign adversaries. Of course, any restriction comes at a loss for scientists, who naturally value completely open communication, information, and collaboration. As can be seen by historical and contemporary example and circumstances, even the most reasoned and rationale security policies can have significant impact on the American scientific community and their work. Such is the result of the unfortunate fact that, even while scientists engage in their work for the betterment of humanity and a greater understanding of the world around us, the products of science are inherently neutral – if an actor wishes to use knowledge or technology for harm, it can often easily be applied toward that end. This is particularly true in the modern day as technologies are rapidly advancing, proliferating, and becoming more capable. Considering that, the divide between these two communities and the policies that manifest as a result are likely to remain.

Addressing the Government Role in the Energy “Grand Challenge”

Energy, occupying a prominent position as a technology “grand challenge,” has invited significant levels of investment into capabilities that will further advance and improve its production. The importance of energy production to the United States cannot be understated; the energy sector contributes upwards of $1.5 trillion to the domestic economy. Considering this, the United States’ overall investments in energy technology research, and the results of those investments to date, have been seen by many as considerably inadequate. This essay examines the energy options available to the United States today, exploring their respective advantages and disadvantages. From that, it addresses where and how the United States government should intervene to address, and potentially correct, the imbalances of investment apparent in energy technology research.

The United States presently makes use of a mix of energy sources, some of which have a long history of utilization while others are emergent through new technologies, capabilities, and investments. Each have a set of unique advantages and disadvantage – technological, economic, and in utilization – which impact their effectiveness, efficiency, and cost. In approaching the proper government role in addressing the energy “grand challenge,” these advantages and disadvantages serve as important metrics that need be considered.

The predominance of American energy currently comes from non-renewable sources: oil, coal, and natural gas. As the traditional sources for American energy production, the advantages of these resources are multifold. The United States’ energy infrastructure – designed to support their extraction, transportation, and production – allows ease of access to the energy derived from them. In terms of cost, non-renewable sources are, at present, substantially cheaper than alternatives; the long history of electricity generation using these resources has progressively driven down associated costs through technological iteration. Moreover, there is a general abundance of these resources available in the United States – the United States is the world’s leader in natural gas and oil production. Yet, despite this, these resources bear significant disadvantages as well; hence the government’s push to catalyze the development of renewable alternatives. Key among them are the significant levels of carbon dioxide pollution (among other pollutants) that they produce and emit into the atmosphere. Climate scientists argue that increasing carbon dioxide levels will have irreversibly profound negative impacts on the planet’s environment and, accordingly, on humanity. Likewise, methods used to extract natural gas, such as fracking, have been targeted as the source of severe environmental degradation. Finally, though the United States may be the world’s largest producer of oil, it nonetheless continues to rely upon oil imports to fuel its broad energy production needs. National dependence on the global oil market raises national security concerns, as oil price volatility, as well as instability in oil producing regions of the globe, have an impact on the United States’ economy and security.

Alongside these non-renewables, another longstanding source of American energy production has been nuclear energy. Among nuclear energy’s advantages, it offers the potential for near-unlimited energy supply (as nuclear fuels, though not necessarily abundant, are long-lasting) and emits, relative to non-renewables, little pollution into the atmosphere. Nuclear power plants can technically be built anywhere and can operate with high load factors – often at 90%. Yet as history has shown, nuclear power plants often suffer serve cost overruns, passing costs off onto energy consumers. As government subsidies waned, so too have the economics of nuclear power. The issue of nuclear waste is considerable; radioactive and long-lasting, nuclear waste’s disposal has become difficult topic politically and logistically. Most importantly, there is significant public backlash against the use of nuclear energy – the perceived dangers associated with nuclear, exacerbated by the Three Mile Island and Fukushima incidents, have created considerable opposition against the construction of further nuclear power plants.

Finally, there are several renewable energy technologies that are beginning to come to the fore. By 2010, energy produced by non-nuclear renewable sources had grown to supply 8% of national consumption; this trend of growth is expected to continue. Among these technologies are hydro, wood, corn ethanol, geothermal, wind, and solar. While the diversity of renewable options and their increasing share of national energy production may suggest success in the development of renewable sources, their disadvantages are worth note.

Hydropower provides clean and essentially carbon-free power. However, hydropower stations, often in the form of dams, are complicated projects and often expensive to build. By their physical need for flowing water, their scalability and economics are limited by geography – most low-cost sites in the United States have already been developed. Moreover, hydropower output depends on the strength of their water source, which varies by season and year. Wood-derived power, meanwhile, is mostly available in the timber-producing states of the Southeast and Northwest. The growth of this source will necessarily track with lumber and paper production. Producing corn ethanol, the only renewable source competing with oil, is not a technically complex process. However, the economics of corn ethanol for fuel are poor; it contains only two-thirds as much energy per gallon as gasoline and requires the purchase of huge amounts of corn, which divert crops from the food supply. Subsidies that incentivized the forcing of ethanol onto the market were passed off in cost onto American consumers, who additionally must shoulder the cost of higher food prices because of the associated decrease in supply. Geothermal, which makes use of high-pressure water trapped in seismically active areas, leaves a very small environmental footprint. However, its scalability is understandably limited by geography and, accordingly, faces little prospects for production growth in the years ahead.

As the renewable energy sources that have perhaps garnered the most attention and enthusiasm in recent years, wind and solar produce a surprisingly limited share of the United States’ supply. Nonetheless, they have experienced rapid growth. Wind power is environmentally clean. However, as of 2012, its economics were costly compared to non-renewables; nonetheless, these costs are beginning to decline. Relying on the force of the wind, this source power is intermittent, has a substantially slow load factor, and is generally disproportionately available at night. Moreover, the most state-of-the-art turbines require large wind farms which generate considerable opposition from populated areas, thereby forcing them into remote areas which necessitate expensive transmission lines. Solar power, meanwhile, is tremendously environmentally friendly. However, with very low load factors and efficiency, it remains at present too expensive for widespread application and use. Like wind, however, its costs too have begun to considerably decline in recent years.

The quest for new energy options – particularly renewables – is and remains a priority for the federal government; however, intensive federal research and investment into these renewable sources has yet to produce transformative results capable of supplanting our need for non-renewables. Noting the disadvantages listed above, a key metric is their comparatively limited economics – considering load factor capability and efficiency – and high costs relative to non-renewables. This suggests that renewable energy technologies invested in and brought to market today have been prematurely commercialized; for a sector as large as energy, forcing the use of more expensive forms can have serious consequences for growth.

For renewables to succeed in the “grand challenge,” they must be cost-competitive when they launch into established markets and scale up rapidly if they are to make a difference. This “moment of market launch” problem, as important as the traditional “valley of death,” is the key issue underlying the imbalances of investment apparent in energy technology research. Addressing it will take government intervention in the “front-end,” and particularly “back-end,” of energy R&D. Of note, however, is that the government should legislate standardized support and intervene in common ways across technologies, so that technology neutrality is preserved and the optimal emergent technology has the best chance to succeed – a necessary approach if a sustainable, economical energy solution aligned to the pressures of the commercial market is to be found.

Foremost among suggested approaches regarding the front-end is the need for direct government support for long and short-term research and development and technology prototyping. Notably, the energy industry invests less than 1% of annual revenues in R&D for new technology. Laboratory work, being relatively inexpensive, is an area in which the government has a comparative advantage; the federal energy technology budget can be focused on conceptual and technical research. The establishment of Energy Frontier Research Centers, research hubs, and the Advanced Research Projects Agency–Energy are steps toward creating a more robust and capable front-end that accelerates innovation and cuts technology costs; government funding toward these initiatives should be prioritized. Beyond this, the government’s energy R&D portfolio should consider the “moment of market launch” issue facing new energy technologies. To that end, agencies should seek and support technologies that offer new functionalities upon market launch and therefore command a premium price. Likewise, agencies should strive to fast-forward research agendas to develop technologies to a stage where they are cost-competitive upon market launch.

Yet to directly address the key issues facing renewables, the government’s innovation system – historically focused on the front-end – will need to emphasis a focus on the back-end of energy R&D through the creation of initial commercial markets for new energy technologies. Among the suggestions issued, and debated, regarding appropriate government intervention in the back end are: tax credits – particularly those with incentives that offer additional benefits for the next stages of efficiency gains; loan guarantees – which should involve a wider risk portfolio and support more commercial-scale demonstrations than has traditionally been the case, in order to foster low market-entry costs; low-cost financing; and price guarantees. Government procurement programs are seen as a significant back-end enabler: boosting innovation and mandating efficiency in the federal building sector could provide a significant test bed and initial market for new energy technologies. Making greater use of federal regulatory authority to strengthen the back-end would be a powerful means to drive significant energy savings. Mandating minimum energy-efficiency standards is a method to incentivize the use of increasingly energy-efficient renewable sources; regulatory mandates could encourage the use of technologies that, in a non-regulated market, would face contested launch. Moreover, promoting an energy services model that rewards efficiency, not power sales, would, if coupled with financing tools to offset costs, help consumers achieve savings – boosting energy efficiency, after all, is among the cheapest methods toward progress in the energy sector. Through regulatory energy-efficiency mandates, the government need not pick “winners” and “losers” or selectively invest in particular technologies, but rather would incentivize efficiency iteration in a portfolio of technologies; the most commercially effective energy technology would emerge.

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